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Abstract 
Argumentation is the process of constructing 
arguments about propositions, and the assign­
ment of statements of confidence to those propo­
sitions based on the nature and relative strength 
of their supporting arguments. The process is 
modelled as a labelled deductive system, in 
which propositions are doubly labelled with the 
grounds on which they are based and a represen­
tation of the confidence attached to the argument. 
Argument construction is captured by a general­
ised argument consequence relation based on the 
A, �-fragment of minimal logic. Arguments can 
be aggregated by a variety of numeric and sym­
bolic flattening functions. This approach appears 
to shed light on the common logical structure of a 
variety of quantitative, qualitative and defeasible 
uncertainty calculi. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Bayesian probability theory is the most widely accepted 
mathematical framework for reasoning under uncertainty. 
However questions about its universal applicability have 
often been raised. Before the middle of the seventeenth 
century, when Pascal and the Port Royal school laid the 
foundations of the modem theory, frequentistic and 
numerical ideas about probability were not self-evident, 
and in the modern period doubts about its generality con­
tinue to surface (Hacking 1975). Partly as a response to 
these doubts various alternative numerical schemes for 
reasoning under uncertainty, such as fuzzy sets, possibility 
theory and belief functions, have recently achieved promi­
nence (e.g. Kruse 1991; Kruse and Seigel 1991). 
The general assumption that uncertainty must be repre­
sented quantitatively has also been widely questioned, par­
ticularly in AI. Issues include (a) claims that quantitative 
notions of uncertainty do not capture important intuitions 
about doubt and belief, (b) worries about the interpretation 
of the numbers which should constrain and guide their use, 
and (c) practical problems such as how to deal with situa­
tions where quantitative data are not available. As a conse­
quence interest has grown in the use of qualitative and 
logical methods for uncertain and defeasible reasoning. 
Various non-quantitative frameworks for reasoning under 
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uncertainty have been proposed including non-monotonic 
logics (e.g. Bell 1990), qualitative and semiqualitative cal­
culi (e.g. Kyberg 1991; Wellman 1990), and informal 
frameworks like Cohen's endorsement scheme (Cohen 
1985) and Fox's linguistic predicates (Fox 1984). 
There is now a common, though controversial, view that 
different techniques for managing uncertainty are legiti­
mate and have different contributions to make (Clark, 
1990; Fox 1986; Krause and Fox 1991; Saffiotti 1987). 
Many efforts are under way to develop techniques for 
using calculi in combination, and also to identify formal 
frameworks which unify some or all of the proposals 
(Dubois and Prade 1990; Ginsberg 1988; Krause and Fox 
1991; Parsons 1991; Saffiotti and Umkehrer 1991). 
Our interest is to develop an extended logic language in 
which calculi embodying different ideas about uncertainty 
management can be accommodated in a principled way 
(Fox et al. 1992). In particular we are exploring the possi­
bility that "argumentation", deducing reasons to believe or 
doubt propositions (and reasons to believe or doubt argu­
ments) provides a way of doing this. A formal system for 
argumentation is presented and ways in which this may 
shed light on a common logical structure for a variety of 
calculi are discussed. 
2 ARGUMENTATION 
In a standard logic, L, an argument is a sequence of infer­
ences leading to a conclusion. If the argument is correct, 
then the conclusion is true. An argument 
PI> ... , Pn f-L q 
is correct in the logic L if q follows from the rules and the 
axioms of L augmented with p 1, 
. .
. , Pn· Therefore a correct 
argument simply yields a proposition ·q, or a sentence 
which can be paraphrased as "q is true (in the context PJ. 
.. . ,p,J". 
In the approach we take, this traditional form of logic 
based argumentation is extended to allow arguments not 
only to prove propositions but also merely to indicate sup­
port for or even doubt in them, by assigning labels to argu­
ments which designate the confidence warranted by the 
arguments for their conclusions. Confidences may be 
expressed in a variety of representations without modify­
ing the underlying inference system. 
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Figure 1: Inference Rules of LA. 
3 ARGUMENTATION CONSEQUENCE 
RELATION 
Our extended form of argumentation is summarised by the 
following schema: 
Database 1- ACR (Sentence, Grounds, Sign) 
where 1- ACR is an argumentation consequence relation 
(ACR). To illustrate, consider the following informal med­
ical argument: there is reason to believe that the patient 
has cancer, because she is elderly and has recently lost 
weight and I know that this is a classical presentation of 
an advanced malignancy. Here, the database comprises the 
beliefs the medical reasoner holds about the patient and 
the medical theory on which the medical reasoner's justifi­
cations are based. The sentence about which we are con­
structing the argument <;an be any meaningful locution, in 
this case: the patient has cancer. The grounds are some 
explicit reflection of the structure of the argument. Ideally 
the grounds comprise a complete recording of the argu­
ment structure, but other ways of representing the grounds 
are possible, such as the set of assumptions it makes 
together with an identifier for the theory under which the 
argument is constructed; the actual choice of representa­
tion will depend on the intended application. Finally, the 
s�gn is some qualification of the conclusion. In general, 
signs can be drawn from a variety of "dictionaries" of 
numerical coefficients, symbolic terms, etc. In the simplest 
case, the atomic qualifier "supported" might be chosen, 
meaning that the argument warrants a qualitative increase 
in belief in the conclusion. 
4 FLAT TENING AND AGGREGATION 
Given some set of arguments for p whose confidence 
labels are drawn from a single dictionary D1 we can flatten 
these arguments to yield a confidence label drawn from D2 
to represent the overall confidence in p (we do not exclude 
the case that D1 = D2). Suppose the formulae of interest 
are expressed in the language L and the argument labels 
belong to A. Then a flattening function has the general 
form: 
flat: P(L X A X D1) � P(L X Dz) 
In this paper we are mainly interested in flattening argu­
ments for a specific formula, p. We call this aggregation: 
fla�: P(L x A xD1) �D2 
Aggregation of arguments for and against some proposi­
tion means to compute an overall value for the overall con­
fidence in the proposition from the set of individual 
arguments. 
5 THE ARGUMENTATION THEOREM 
PROVER 
An argumentation theorem prover (ATP) has been defined 
in (Krause et al. 1983) and implemented in Prolog which 
returns propositions labelled with a representation of their 
supporting arguments. The theorem prover is for an ACR 
which is generic in the choice of dictionary; it can be 
instantiated with different dictionaries of confidence 
labels, provided that these satisfy a number of constraints. 
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A variety of aggregation functions can be defined for each 
dictionary. The kind of aggregation that results is termed 
increasing rrwnotonic aggregation, because the procedure 
is only capable of aggregating "positive" support; as we 
shall see, accommodation of arguments which reduce sup­
port for a conclusion requires a little extra machinery. 
Using this framework, any argument that can be con­
structed for a certain proposition from a given set of facts 
can be computed. In constructing the individual argu­
ments, confidence measures on the facts are propagated to 
the conclusion of the arguments. Then the overall confi­
dence in the conclusion of the arguments is computed by 
aggregating the confidence in the individual arguments. 
The ATP reported in (Krause et al. 1993) is based on the "• 
-+fragment of minimal logic with implicit negation (i.e. 
-,p is represented by p � ..L). The results of Ambler (1992) 
ensures that the construction and aggregation of arguments 
is done in a mathematical coherent way and (Ambler 
1992) provides a formal semantics for increasing monot­
onic aggregation over arguments constructed using mini­
mal logic. For the labelling of arguments this version of 
the ATP relies on the strong correspondence between 
terms of the primitively typed A.-calculus and proofs in the 
"• �-fragment of minimal logic. However, here we will 
label each axiom in a database with (a singleton set con­
taining) an atomic label, and represent an argument by a 
set of labels referring to the axioms used in constructing 
that argument. 
The confidence labels are drawn from a dictionary with 
some associated operator •, some total order � and some 
top element 1. Using p, q to denote propositions, a, b to 
denote sets of axiom labels and l, m to denote confidence 
labels, we present a general logic of argumentation (LA) 
in figure 1. 
LA is generic in the choice of dictionary; for a particular 
choice, D, we use LAn to denote the resulting argumen�­
tion consequence relation. 
We will show two examples from (Krause et al. 1993) to 
show how increasing monotonic aggregation works in 
practice when applied to arguments in LA. 
Example: In the first example we choose a discrete dic­
tionary with just two elements: 
Oj,ounded = { +,++}, 
with ++ denoting absolute certainty and + denoting any 
weaker form of support. The following operator, minimal 
support •. is defined over Dbounded: 
l•m=m•l 
+ •1=+ 
++. ++ =++ 
where 1, m E Dbounded and ++ is the top element (i.e. + < 
++). 
To aggregate the overall confidence in a proposition p 
given by a database K we need the set of arguments for p 
that can be constructed from K. This set, (LAbnd)PK, is 
defined as: 
(LAbnd)PK = { (p, a, 1) I K 1- lAbniP. a, l)} 
The aggregation function, AGGbnd is defined for any data­
base and proposition: 
{
++, if (3a)((p, a,++) E (LAbnd)PK) 
AGGbnd(K, p) = 
I(LAbnd)PK I, otherwise 
AGGbnd has the dictionary: 
DboundedNat =Nat U { ++}, 
as its co-domain. Let K be a database which captures the 
knowledge that biological cells are normally growth lim­
ited, but tumour cells are not so limited: 
(cell(x) � growthLtd(x), { c1}, +) 
(turrwurCell(x) � cell(x), {tl}. ++) 
(turrwurCell(x) � -,growthLtd(x), {t2}, ++) 
(turrwurCell(someX), (fl}, ++) 
Note that formulae with free variables should be read as 
schemas representing all ground instances of that formula. 
For simplicity, we have not parameterised the labels with 
the variables in the corresponding axioms, although this 
should strictly be done to identify distinct instances of the 
schemas. 
Querying the database K with the question growthLtd(­
someX), will result in the aggregation function returning 
the value 1, because there is one supporting argument 
(whose grounds are { c1 , tl}) and no confirming argu­
ments. Querying with -,growthLtd(someX), will result in 
the aggregation function returning the value ++, because 
there is one confirming argument (whose grounds are {t2 , 
fl}). 
Example: In the second example we assign numerical 
confidence coefficients to facts in the database and propa­
gate these during the construction of the argument, in a 
way such that the label of the argument represents a lower 
bound for the confidence in the conclusion. The dictionary 
is: 
Dnum = [0,1] 
with 1 as the top element and multiplication as the distin­
guished operator. 
The aggregation function is a generalization of Bernoulli's 
rule, (Bernoulli 1 713). Let K' be the database backing the 
informal medical argument given above regarding the eld­
erly patient, X, with weight loss. Consider the two argu­
ments, informally written as: 
(cancer, "X has weightloss", 0.7) 
(cancer, "X is elderly", 0.5) 
For the sake of the example the symptoms are treated as 
independent and the numerical coefficients have been cho­
sen arbitrarily. Aggregating in accordance with Bernoulli's 
rule yields: 
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AGGnum(K', cancer)= 0.7+0.5-(0.7 X 0.5) = 0.85, 
where AGG num represents Bernoulli's rule. (A more elabo­
rate version of this example in which dependencies 
between arguments are considered is given in (Krause et 
al. 1993).) 
Essentially arguments in LA have the role of computing 
"atomic" pieces of support that can be constructed in the 
context of some database. From the set of all these atomic 
pieces the overall confidence can be aggregated. In calcu­
lating the confidence in a specific proposition, evidence 
for its negation is not taken into account. However, the 
concept of flattening allows for such heuristics to be added 
on top of the basic notion of aggregation. 
Because the ATP works by computing atomic pieces of 
support, a formal correspondence to certain aspects of the 
quantitative uncertainty calculi can be established. An 
informal example of this has already been given in the 
above example using Bernoulli's rule. In (Ambler 1992), a 
formal correspondence to the Dempster-Shafer theory has 
been established. 
6 AGGREGATION CRITERIA 
Based on abstract dictionaries we define a set of con­
straints, that can be used to classify the different kinds of 
aggregation. The idea is that a specific kind of aggregation 
satisfies a set of constraints if its dictionary can be pro­
jected onto the abstract dictionary in a way such that the 
constraint is satisfied. 
The simplest abstract dictionary is: 
D genJJric = { +} • 
An ACR based on this dictionary takes any argument for a 
proposition as a supporting argument, that is it results in 
an overall increase in the confidence in the proposition. 
For such calculi, therefore, there is a constraint on the way 
in which the relative force of sets of arguments are meas­
ured: 
flatp(Arg):::;; flatp(Arg u {(p, a,+)}) (F1) 
Here, Arg is any set of (Proposition, Grounds, Sign) argu­
ment triples for the proposition p. The weak constraint 
(Fl) is satisfied by any instantiation of the ATP. In this 
'generic' calculus arguments have equal force; no 'belief 
mass' is assigned to them. 
In general there is no limit to the number of arguments that 
can be constructed for a proposition. Intuitively, however, 
some arguments are conclusive. This is captured by the 
abstract dictionary: 
Dbowuled= (+,++}. 
In the presence of a conclusive argument flattening is com­
pletely dominated by this argument: 
flatp(((p, a,++)}) = flatp(Arg u ((p, a,++)}) (F2) 
This constraint is also satisfied by any instantiation of the 
ATP, by mapping the top element 1 of the dictionary to ++. 
So far we have only been concerned with increase in confi­
dence. We may define a "complementation operator",-, as: 
if p = -,q, then -p = q, otherwise -p = -,p. Then, the com­
plementary possibility of having a decrease in confidence 
is reflected by the dictionary 
Ddelta = (+,-}. 
In order to strengthen the generic calculus by representing 
the relationship between p and -p the complementation 
constraint (C1) is defined to explicate the relationship 
between a proposition and its dual. 
f- ACR (p, a,+) ifff- ACR (-p, a,-) (Cl) 
This constraint is on the ACR and not on the flattening 
function. It is generic in the definition of duality, although 
this will normally coincide with logical negation. The only 
modification that can be allowed is a strengthening of log­
ical negation, reflected in the requirement (C2). 
1- ACR (-,p, a,+) if 1- ACR (-p, a,+) (C2) 
Flattening in a delta calculus should honour the constraint 
(F1) as well as (F3) below. 
flatp(Arg) 2: flatp(Arg u ( (p, a, -)}) (F3) 
Interestingly, the instantiations of the ATP do not satisfy 
(C1) and they only satisfy (F3) because 2: coincides with 
=. In aggregating arguments for (against) a proposition, 
any argument against (for) this proposition is simply 
neglected. However, this defect can be circumvented by 
explicitly aggregating both arguments pro and con and 
computing the overall confidence on the basis of these two 
individual confidences. 
Finally we specialise the delta calculus with an extended 
dictionary, 
Dbowuied-delta"" { ++, +, -, --} 
including symbols for upper and lower confidence bounds. 
A bounded delta-calculus must satisfy the above con­
straints together with: 
1- ACR (p, a,++) iff I- ACR (-p, a,--) (C3) 
f- ACR (-,p, a,++) iff- ACR (-p, a,++) (C4) 
flatp({(p, a,--)})= flatp(Arg u {(p, a,--)}) (F4) 
But note that constraint F4 does not apply if Arg contains a 
confirming argument for p (i.e 3b.(p, b, ++) E Arg); this 
would correspond to a flat contradiction. Still more spe­
cific abstract dictionaries can be introduced to give finer 
characterizations of specific kinds of aggregation, but the 
above four calculi provide an appropriate starting point. 
7 QUANTITATIVE UNCERTAINTY 
CALCULI 
We suggest that argumentation can provide a common log­
ical form for different uncertainty calculi . As the examples 
have revealed, aggregation of arguments is a hybrid of 
qualitative and quantitative reasoning. The aggregation 
criteria were mainly designed to reflect properties of quali­
tative reasoning, but in a naive way they also reflect prop-
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erties of quantitative calculi with conditional confidence 
values. 
For instance, if we assume p and the theory we are using 
includes the causal relationship, P(qlp, Ll) > P(ql Ll), then 
as in simple probability theory our confidence in q will 
increase in the context A A way of making this increase in 
confidence explicit over a dictionary consisting of the 
interval [0, oo] is by computing the ratio: 
P(ql Ll) 
P(- ql Ll) 
In the particular example above, we would then see the 
increase as: 
P(qip, Ll) 
P(- qlp, Ll) 
8 ARGUMENTATION AND 
DE FEASIBILITY 
In general there are no consistency requirements on the 
databases we accept. For instance in the bounded-delta 
calculus we may derive (p, a,++) and (p, a',--), where a, 
a' are different labels. (If the argument labelling algebra is 
not strict enough, then it can even happen that a = a', but 
such ACRs would be too weak to reflect the essential fea­
ture of most uncertainty calculi: the counting up of inde­
pendent pieces of evidence.) This ability to represent 
contradictory conclusions may at first appear to be an 
unacceptable state of affairs, but it is in fact highly desira­
ble. Situations where one can claim to be able to argue for 
some proposition p while also being able to argue against 
p on different assumptions are commonplace. In medicine, 
for instance, opinions which are flatly contradictory or 
inconsistent with observations or received wisdom are not 
unusual. Scientific progress actually depends upon com­
peting theories, with new theories often arising from 
anomalies, contradictory findings, and observed excep­
tions to well entrenched beliefs. Since practical reasoning 
cannot avoid inconsistencies the ability to manage them is 
important (e.g. Fox et al. 199l a; Gabbay and Hunter 
1991). 
Conflicts caused by such inconsistencies can be resolved 
by considering the logical certainty of the arguments. 
There are several approaches that can be taken, but we will 
restrict the present discussion to discounting and rebutting 
of arguments in the bounded-delta calculus. 
8.1 DEFEATING AN ARGUMENT 
More advanced uses of arguments emerge when we allow 
arguments to have different degrees of logical certainty, 
made explicit through a relation on the argument labels. 
One step in this direction is to allow one argument to 
defeat another. 
An argument (P, a, l), l e { +,++}, is discounted by the 
argument (Q, b, m), e { -,--}, if the argument labelled a 
depends on Q. 
An argument (P, a, l), e { +,++}, is rebutted by the argu­
ment (Q, b, m), e { -,--},if P = Q and either m =-- or m =­
and l = +. 
An argument (P, a, l) is defeated, if it is discounted or 
rebutted by some argument which is not defeated. 
The concepts of rebutting and discounting are very similar 
to Pollock's (1992) notions of rebutting and undercutting 
defeat, though our work is based on that of Toulmin 
(1958). Toulmin's work was not formal in a mathematical 
sense. However, he did provide a useful schematic repre­
sentation of an argument. Essentially, he modelled an 
argument as a claim supported by some data, with that 
claim backed by a warrant. A claim may be rebutted by an 
argument that directly refutes the claim, though we extend 
this with the notion of discounting an argument by attack­
ing the validity of the data or warrant in the given context. 
8.2 SELECTIVE AGGREGATION 
A new form for aggregation can now be defined, where 
only undefeated arguments are taken into account. This 
form of aggregation depends on a hybrid of object-level 
and logical certainty assigned to the individual arguments. 
Object-level certainty is assigned as confidence labels and 
logical certainty is determined through the notion of 
defeat. Put simply, undefeated arguments are more certain 
than defeated ones. A full discussion of this approach to 
logical certainty can be found in (Elvang-G0ransson et al. 
1993). 
9 META-ARGUMENTATION 
In previous presentations this more advanced form for 
aggregation was called Meta-argumentation, essentially 
reflecting that arguments are themselves objects of argu­
ments. The ambition of the Meta-argumentation program 
was to make argumentation structures explicit as objects in 
a meta-logic of argumentation and supply expressive 
power for representing discounting and rebutting in the 
language itself. This allowed for the further extension of 
making conflicts explicit in this meta-language. In this 
presentation we have decided to accommodate these con­
cepts in the flattening functions, resulting in a more coher­
ent presentation within the realm of LDS. 
10 RESOLVING CONFLIC TS AND 
MAKING DECISIONS 
So far, arguments have been backed only by a single the­
ory. Therefore conflicts were essentially caused by logical 
inconsistencies in the theory. Only through the extra struc­
ture added to databases and arguments could such conflicts 
occasionally be resolved. Also, the aggregation procedures 
have been based on aggregation over any constructible 
argument. However, it is not always the case that argu­
ments are constructed from the same database and quite 
often decisions are made from an incomplete set of argu-
Argumentation as a General Framework for Uncertain Reasoning 433 
ments that are regarded as sufficient to back the decision. 
One interesting approach would be to view arguments as 
constructed contingently on an agent's database. Thus, for 
example, if two agents with conflicting databases are 
debating a proposition, then this might lead to conflicting 
arguments being formulated. This kind of conflict is not 
caused by logical inconsistency in a particular theory, but 
rather by disagreement over what data are applicable to the 
problem at hand; the conflict can only be resolved by mak­
ing at least one of the agents revise its theory. Analo­
gously, a decision maker may be thought of as engaging in 
a private debate, in which conflicting arguments are for­
mulated on different hypotheses for interpreting the data. 
Such agents can be conceived as having reflective capabil­
ities, acknowledging that their beliefs (theories) can lead 
to contradictory conclusions and if such contradictions are 
detected one or more theories will need to be modified. 
There are a number of strategies which may be taken to 
resolve such conflicts, the precise strategy taken depend­
ing on the nature of the situation at hand. A more exten­
sive account of conflict resolution strategies within the 
framework of argumentation can be found in (Elvang­
Gjjransson et al. 1993). 
11 CONCLUSION 
This has been a wide ranging survey of the use of argu­
mentation as a general purpose framework for reasoning 
under uncertainty. For brevity, much of the discussion has 
been kept relatively informal, but most of the work dis­
cussed has received rigorous development; the main 
results are to be found in (Ambler 1992), (Elvang-Gjjrans­
son 1993) and (Krause et al. 1993). 
The basic ideas of argumentation have been in practical 
use in medical decision making applications for some time 
(Fox et al. 1991b; Huang et al. 1993). The formal develop­
ments presented here validate these methods, and suggest 
important extensions to the practical techniques currently 
in use. Although our applications have so far been con­
fined to medical decision making, the formal results sug­
gest that an argumentation framework offers a general 
basis for developing reasoning techniques which accom­
modate quantitative, qualitative and wider logical 
approaches to the management of uncertainty. 
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